Module Handbook

  • Dynamischer Default-Fachbereich geändert auf WIW

Course WIW-IOE-VT-K-7

Contract Theory (3V, 4.5 LP)

Course Type

SWS Type Course Form CP (Effort) Presence-Time / Self-Study
3 V Lecture 4.5 CP 45 h 90 h
(3V) 4.5 CP 45 h 90 h

Basedata

SWS 3V
CP, Effort 4.5 CP = 135 h
Position of the semester 1 Sem. in SuSe
Level [7] Master (Advanced)
Language [EN] English
Lecturers
Area of study [WIW-IOE] Microecomonics
Livecycle-State [NORM] Active

Contents

How can economic actors overcome incentive problems, which may be caused by diverse factors e.g. asymmetric information?

Central Topics:

  • Principal-Agent Models
  • Incentive Constraints and Participation Constraints
  • Hidden Information: Lemons-Problem, Screening, Self-Selection, Signalling
  • Hidden Actions: Risk Premium, Limited Liability, Team-Problems
  • Dynamic Extensions and Tournaments
  • Applications in Industrial Economics and Finance

Literature

Literature:
  • Laffont, J.-J., Martimort, D. (2001): The Theory of Incentives: The Principal-Agent Model. Princeton University Press. Princeton und Woodstock.

Materials

  • Lecture documents
  • Problem sets

Requirements for attendance (informal)

None

Requirements for attendance (formal)

None

References to Course [WIW-IOE-VT-K-7]

Module Name Context
[WIW-IOE-VT-M-7] Contract Theory P: Obligatory 3V, 4.5 LP